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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-TREATMENT oF NoNDISTRIBUTABLE
CAPITAL GAINS OF DoMESTic TRUST WITH FOREIGN BENEFICIARIES-Taxpayer,

trustee of a domestic inter vivos trust, sued for a refund of United States
income taxes paid on nondistributable capital gains of the trust. Trustee
claimed that since all the beneficiaries of the trust were United Kingdom
residents, this income was tax-exempt under the United States-United
Kingdom tax convention provision that a United Kingdom resident "shall
be exempt from United States tax on gains from the sale or exchange of
capital assets."1 On appeal by the United States from a district court
judgment for the trustee, held, reversed. Although distributable gains are
allowed the exemption,2 long term capital gains realized by a domestic
trust, and accumulated for later distribution, are considered income to the
trust regardless of the beneficiaries' residence; the convention was not intended to override United States law which treats a trust as a separate taxable entity.3 Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
371 U.S. 810 (1962).
The most reasonable argument for the exemption of nondistributable
capital gains sought in the principal case would seem to be that, since
distributable gains are exempt4 under the convention's article XIV, there
is no logical reason for taxing gains which are accumulated for later distribution. On the facts as presented in the principal case, interests in both
distributable and accumulated gains are vested in the beneficiaries, and
neither is taxable to them in the United Kingdom, 5 though both would
be taxable under United States law. Under the convention, as applied
by the court, the only distinction between the two types of gain is in the
lapse of time between receipt by the beneficiaries of distributed gains (when
realized by the trust) and accumulated gains (upon termination of the
trust)-a distinction which logically appears to be an artificial basis for
radically different tax treatment. This reasoning, although arguably correct, does not compel a conclusion that the convention was to be applied
on the basis of such apparent logic, or that a distinction for tax purposes
between distributable and nondistributable capital gains was unintended.
The primary interpretative inquiry, therefore, must be directed to the
purpose and nature of the convention. In the principal case, the trustee
argued that the purpose of the convention was to establish strict equality
1 Convention With the United Kingdom Respecting Double Taxation and Taxes
on Income and Protocol, April 16, 1945 and June 6, 1946, art. XIV, 60 Stat. 1384,
T.I.A.S. No. 1546 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. Under article II [60 Stat. 1378
(1946)], the term "United Kingdom" includes Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales)
and Northern Ireland. Since ratification, the convention has been extended, as allowed
under article XXII(l) [60 Stat. 1387 (1946)], to cover a total of twenty British overseas
territories. See 4 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1) 4279.035.
2 Income currently distributable to beneficiaries is allowed the article XIV exemption. See T.D. 5569, 1947-2 CuM. BuLL. 100, § 7.519(c).
3 See !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 64l(a)(l), 643(a)(3).
4 See note 2 supra.
5 See Jones v. Leeming, [1930) A.C. 415.
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of tax treatment between residents of each country realizing income from
sources in the other country. Since the United Kingdom imposed no
capital gains tax, the trustee concluded that a strict equality approach
required that the United States exempt this trust from a capital gains tax,
the economic burden of which would fall on United Kingdom residents.
The competing argument, accepted by the court, is based on the proposition that the differences in theory and terminology between the United
States and United Kingdom tax systems make identical tax treatment
impossible. Therefore, the convention should be literally interpreted and
all taxes not explicitly removed or modified by the terms of the convention should remain in force under domestic tax laws. 6
Despite the apparent logic of the trustee's contentions, the great difficulty in evaluating a particular United States tax in terms of a corresponding United Kingdom tax seems to point out the fallacy in his argument
for equal tax treatment under the convention. This difficulty is particularly apparent in the setting of capital gains treatment. The United States
income tax laws allow preferential capital gains treatment to gain from
the sale or exchange of a "capital asset," which is defined as all property
of the taxpayer, whether or not related to a trade or business, but excluding property dealt with in a particular manner, such as property
held primarily for sale to customers, business property subject to a depreciation allowance, and real property used in a trade or business.7
On the other hand, the United Kingdom does not employ a separate rate
structure for income realized in particular types of transactions. Depending on the nature of the property sold or exchanged (as opposed to the
method of dealing with it), income is considered either fully taxable or
is entirely disregarded for income tax purposes.8 Consequently, the United
6 The literal interpretation of the convention applied by the court is as follows:
article XIV exempts "a resident of the United Kingdom ..•" (emphasis added); article
II(l)(g) defines "resident" as "any person ••• resident in the United Kingdom •.•"
(emphasis added); the convention does not define "person," but article 11(3) states that
"in the application of the provisions of the present Convention by one of the Contracting Parties any term not otherwise defined shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning which it has under the laws of that Contracting Party relating
to the taxes which are the subject of the present Convention"; under United States law
[INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 770l(a)(l)], "trust" is included within the meaning of "person"; substituting "trust" for "resident" in article XIV, then, the exemption cannot
apply because the trust is a resident of the United States. Convention, arts. XIV, II(l)(g),
(3), 60 Stat. 1384, 1378, 1379 (1946). As to the trust being a United States resident, see
Bence v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 701, 18 F. Supp. 848 (1937), and Estate of Cooper, 9
B.T.A. 21 (1927). See also PHILLIPS, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT ALIENS AND
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 166 (1952).
7 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1221. Depreciable property and real property used in
a trade or business are actually given more favorable treatment than a capital asset.
Under INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 1231, income from a sale or exchange of these properties is taxable at capital gains rates, while losses are fully deductible from gross income.
8 This nonrecognition of the capital asset, as such, encompasses several features distinctly unfavorable from the American point of view: no deduction is allowed for losses
incurred in property sold or exchanged, and natural resource depletion allowances and
annual property or machinery depreciation allowances (until actual replacement) are
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Kingdom, using a completely different theory of classification, taxes at
ordinary income rates many gains which would receive the more favorable
capital gains treatment in the United States. Conversely, the United States
imposes a capital gains tax on some transactions which would be subjected
to no income tax whatever in the United Kingdom.9 Considering the impact of United Kingdom income tax laws on some transactions which
would receive capital gains treatment in the United States, and the additional burden of a gross receipts stamp tax on securities transactions in
the United Kingdom, it has been stated that neither tax system is more
favorable than the other in regard to overall capital gains treatment.10
Apart from such a generalization, it seems clear that the dissimilar approaches in tax structure make a comparative study necessarily unreliable
as a foundation for any logical inferences.
The foregoing comparison suggests the unsoundness of the trustee's
contention that the United Kingdom does not tax capital gains; more importantly, it indicates that the convention's article XIV exemption (under
which the trustee claims) was not given by the United States simply to
match a pre-existent United Kingdom exemption.11 It would appear that
the contracting parties did not attempt a point-by-point alignment of the
two tax systems. Emphasis was placed on relief from elements in both
systems which singly, or in combination, appeared most burdensome to
international trade. As the systems themselves differed, likewise the unfavorable elements requiring modification were not the same in each country. The convention sought to balance these elements through a series of
reciprocal compromises. Realization that the convention's promises were
bargained for in this manner, as opposed to "across the board" tax equalization, leads to a realistic evaluation of the convention's purposes. Abolition of double taxation was, without question, its primary aim. Although
not allowed. See MAGILL, PARKER &: KING, A SUMMARY
(1935).

OF THE

BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 20

9 Ibid. A typical example of untaxed gains would be the individual trader's income
from sale or exchange of securities having no connection with his trade or business.
The United Kingdom test is known as the "adventure-in-trade" concept. Where a certain
type of property is neither capable of an income yield or enjoyment to its owner, its
sale or exchange results in ordinary income or loss. See Income Tax Act of 1952, ch. 10,
§§ 122, 123 (schedule D, case I), 526, in 31 HALSBURY's STATUTES 112, 116, 489 (2d ed. 1952).
See also Jones v. Leeming, (1930] A.C. 415; MAGILL, PARKER 8e KING, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 20(g), and Brudno &: Hollman, The Taxation of Capital Gains in the United States
and the United Kingdom, 1958 BRIT. TAX REv. 26, 40-41. In the setting of securities,
however, it should be noted that the United Kingdom ad valorem stamp tax renders
this tax advantage to the individual trader somewhat illusory. This 2% ad valorem
tax is equivalent to the United States tax on a long-term capital gain of 9% of cost.
Gains above this level would be progressively taxed in the United States up to 25%.
Brudno &: Hollman, supra at 43-44.
10 Brudno &: Hollman, supra note 9, at 43-44.
11 See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Convention Between the United
States, Great Britain and Northern Ireland Respecting Income and Estate Tax of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 56, 62 (1945) [hereinafter
cited as 1945 Hearings], regarding Convention, art. XX, 60 Stat. 1389 (1945).
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"equality" was mentioned in the Senate hearings on this treaty, it does
not appear to have been used in the context of specific tax alignment.12
The legislative history provides abundant evidence that the convention
negotiations were characterized by tightly worded concession and compromise-and that its provisions were to be literally applied. 13 This evidence
of closely circumscribed bilateral negotiation militates for a strict application by the courts; the courts should recognize that the convention does
not-nor was it intended to-cover every transaction having a source of
income in one country and a recipient of that income in the other.14
Assuming that the United Kingdom does tax capital gains, and that
the convention's purpose was not to achieve a strict equality of tax treatment, the question remains whether nondistributable capital gains of the
trust can be brought within the article XIV exemption. On facts identical
to those in the principal case, the Ninth Circuit held, in American Trust
Co. v. Smyth, 16 that such gains are tax-exempt. Since the "economic burden" of the ta.x fell on United Kingdom residents, 16 the exemption was
held to apply regardless of the United States concept of trust entities. The
word "exempt" in article XIV, said the court, should be construed to mean
"release from economic burden." However, such a construction appears
to contradict the specific nature of the convention's terms. It is construction based on the same premises that was argued by the trustee in the principal case, viz., strict equality of tax treatment and the absence of a United
Kingdom capital gains tax. If these ostensibly false premises are ignored,
and if the intent to limit the coverage of the convention is recognized, it
would seem more appropriate to apply domestic law provisions as dictated
by article II(3) of the treaty. "Economic burden," as a test, received no
12 "Equality" is mentioned in the Senate hearings many times, but is used in only
two contexts in the convention. In article XXI it is required that nationals of one
country living in the other be taxed equally with the other country's citizens. The
other category concerns transactions which were previously subject to double taxation;
the convention permits each country to share revenues equally by reducing proportionately the specific tax each applies-the aim being to tax the parties involved but
once. These types of equality have nothing to do with the tax imposed in the principal
case, for no double taxation problem is present. See 1945 Hearings 2, 3, 24, 61.
13 Id. at 2.
14 The definition of "resident" in the Convention, art. II(l)(g}, 60 Stat. 1378 (1946)
["any person ••• who is resident in the United Kingdom for purposes of United Kingdom
tax and not resident in the United States for purposes of United States tax'1, creates
an ambiguity in many situations because a person may be considered a "resident" under
the laws of both countries, and therefore not entitled to convention relief based on
residence. Under article II(3), which expressly reserves the definition of terms not defined in the convention to each country's laws, it appears not only that the convention
failed to cover many transactions, but that it directed the manner by which these
omissions would be handled-namely, by resort to domestic law. See note 5 supra. See
also Alexander, The Income Tax Convention with the United Kingdom, 2 TAX L. REv.
295, 297 (1947); 71 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1163 (1958).
1G 247 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1957), reversing 141 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
16 The court reasoned that since the tax would diminish the distributive shares that
the beneficiaries would take upon termination of the trust, these beneficiaries were
"economically burdened" by the tax. Id. at 153.
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mention in the convention itself. It can hardly be implied, considering
the many transactions which the convention does not cover and the many
instances where taxation at the source of income was retained.17
Despite apparent inequities, it is not the role of the courts to extend
the convention beyond its literal terms. Only the negotiating arm of the
contracting parties can formulate, in a comprehensive and consistent manner, the intent of the convention. Moreover, the courts of England consider the convention as only an addition to their national tax laws.18 These
laws are applied in a strict, literal manner. English courts do not search
for equity in taxation, believing that any modification or extension should
originate in the legislative body which initially fashioned the law.19 American courts should adopt a similar practice in regard to the tax convention,
not only as a means of achieving consistency with the strict application of
the English courts, but, more importantly, as a recognition of the bargaining processes out of which the convention agreement evolved. If the taxation of nondistributable capital gains is deemed inequitable by the negotiating parties, it would seem most appropriate to resolve the problem
through the same method of concession and compromise which characterized the convention's original negotiations. The value of the holding in
the principal case is that it points to a need for some means of periodic,
bilateral revision of the convention. This would provide a proper remedy
for conflicts which inevitably arise. Other tax conventions entered into
by the United States have expressly provided for settlement of future controversies through mutual agreement.20 Such a procedure, if incorporated
into the United States-United Kingdom convention, either by amendment
or by necessary implication, would answer the need for implementation
by proper representatives of each of the contracting countries.2 1

William C. Brashares
17 The "economic burden" test is not mentioned in the 1945 Hearings either. It
would appear that this test is solely attributable to the Ninth Circuit.
18 See KOCH, THE DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 19-20 (1947).
10 Id. at 21.
20 See PHILLll'S, op. cit. supra note 6, at 309-10.
21 If any bilateral modification of article XIV is forthcoming, it seems probable that
greater restriction or even elimination of this exemption will be sought, as opposed
to extension of its coverage. This contention draws support from the fact that in sub•
sequent tax conventions entered into by the United States, the capital gains e.xemption
has not been given. This exemption has proved to be an objectionable feature of the
convention from the American viewpoint, and some writers feel it has created a "tax
discrimination" in favor of United Kingdom residents. It has been further suggested
that the essential reason for granting the exemption to nonresident aliens was the great
difficulty in tracing the income of these persons, and collecting the ta.x; the increased
exchange of tax information between countries has removed this difficulty. Sec Kanter,
The United States Income Tax Treaty Program, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 69, 80-81 (1954). See
also EHRENZWEIG & KocH, INCOME TAX TREATIES 1f 211, at 206 (1949).

